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Abstract
Motivation affects perception, for example when people overestimate the psychological proximity of goal-relevant objects. 
Additionally, proximity maps onto more concrete (vs. abstract) construal. Following from these findings, we predicted that 
people construe goal-relevant stimuli more concretely than goal-irrelevant stimuli. Three experiments tested this idea (total 
N = 305). In Experiment 1, people who were warm (versus cold) grouped cold drinks into more and narrower categories, as 
cold drinks served their goal to cool off. In Experiment 2, heat simulations lead people to represent cooling actions (e.g., 
drinking cold water) in more concrete terms (i.e., as for how instead of why), whereas cold simulations lead people to rep-
resent warming actions in more concrete terms. In Experiment 3, participants evaluated heaters and ventilators based on 
concrete (i.e., single reviews) instead of abstract product information (i.e., overall ratings) if the product was motivationally 
relevant. These findings show that basic motivations can shift the level of abstraction at which people represent objects and 
actions.
Keywords Construal level · Motivation · Goals · Warmth · Cold
Motivation can influence how people construe their subjec-
tive reality. For instance, Princeton and Dartmouth fans who 
watched a football match between the two teams had very 
different impressions of the match and interpreted the events 
on the field in favor of the team they supported (Hastorf and 
Cantril 1954). Subsequently to this early documented case 
of motivated perception, myriad research programs dem-
onstrated that current goals, motives, needs, wishes, hopes, 
worries, and fears can influence which information people 
attend to and which strategies people use to make sense of 
the ambiguous world (for overviews, see e.g., Aarts 2012; 
Fiske 1993, 2010; Gollwitzer and Moskowitz 1996; Kunda 
1990; Showers and Cantor 1985).
Most of this research literature on the “motivated tac-
tician” demonstrates that motivations affect the content of 
people’s construal. That is, people tend to see what they 
want to see. For instance, depending on one’s motivation, 
one interprets events or objects more negatively or more 
positively, such as an incident on the football field which can 
be construed as severe foul or as harmless touch, or a piece 
of organic fruit which can be viewed as expensive extrava-
gance or as healthy addition to one’s diet. We extend previ-
ous research by showing that motivations can also affect the 
level of construal, that is, how concretely versus abstractly 
people represent their reality. We suggest that motivations 
cause people to construe stimuli that are relevant to the cur-
rent motivation on a more concrete level than stimuli that are 
not relevant, much like in a cartoon in which a very hungry 
castaway who floats on a raft through the ocean imagines a 
yummy steak very concretely with all its visual and gusta-
tory details. Specifically, here we investigated the influence 
of temperature (warmth versus cold) on the construal level 
of stimuli that could help to reduce the unpleasantness of 
the temperature.
Motivated perception
The same object can be interpreted very differently, depend-
ing on one’s motivation. This effect even happens at a very 
early stage of perception (Balcetis and Dunning 2010; 
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Dunning and Balcetis 2013). For instance, wishes caused 
participants to interpret an ambiguous figure in a way that 
fits their goals (Balcetis and Dunning 2006). Moreover, 
thirsty participants perceived an ambiguous stimulus as 
more transparent (i.e., water-like) than quenched participants 
(Changizi and Hall 2001). Such effects can be explained by 
an activation of goal-relevant associations, which color the 
interpretation of a given stimulus. For instance, the concept 
“water” and its associated features—such as transparency—
may be more active in thirsty participants than in quenched 
participants, and may thus be more likely to be applied when 
interpreting an ambiguous stimulus.
Of interest for the present research, motivations have been 
shown to influence distance perception (Balcetis 2016; Cole 
et al. 2013; Stefanucci e al. 2008). Desirable objects are 
perceived to be closer than neutral objects (Valdés-Conroy 
et al. 2012). For instance, money appears closer than finan-
cially valueless objects (Cole and Balcetis 2013). Thirsty 
participants estimated a water bottle as being closer than 
participants who were not thirsty (Balcetis and Dunning 
2010). Similarly, a diagnostic survey that provided flatter-
ing feedback appeared to be closer than a survey that pro-
vided critical feedback (Balcetis and Dunning 2010). The 
opposite effect has also been shown: Undesirable stimuli 
appear to be more distant. For instance, distance to the start-
ing point of travel was overestimated by travelers who pre-
ferred their destination over their starting point (Alter and 
Balcetis 2011).
These effects can be explained by different motivational 
directions elicited from the current situation (i.e., the expo-
sure to an affective object, the situational constraints, and the 
available resources; Balcetis 2016). When one is motivated 
to reach a goal or to fulfill a need, one tends to have the drive 
to approach stimuli that are helpful in reaching the goal or in 
fulfilling the need. It has been argued that an intense motive, 
combined with the presence of an object that can satisfy 
that motive, results in a pronounced approach orientation 
(Loewenstein 1996). An approach orientation prepares peo-
ple to act on such stimuli. In this sense, it is functional to 
represent the stimuli closer because closeness enables men-
tal simulation of adaptive responding to the stimulus, and 
thus can facilitate adaptive responding. In contrast, motiva-
tion to avoid a stimulus leads people to see the respective 
stimulus as more distal. One rarely acts on stimuli that one 
wants to avoid, and thus it is psychologically adaptive to 
represent those stimuli as more distal.
Motivated construal level
The functional perspective on motivated cognition implies 
that motivation stimulates any mental representation that 
helps adaptive responding according to the motivation 
(Zhang and Risen 2014). Thereby, motivated cognition is 
part of successful self-regulation (i.e., the purposeful regu-
lation of actions to reach a goal; Carver and Scheier 2016). 
Self-regulation can be structured in different phases, ranging 
from forethought to performance and action, to feedback and 
self-reflection (Zimmerman 2000). Several operations help 
to translate intentions to pursue a goal into the attainment of 
the goal, including affective and behavioral processes, meta-
cognitive knowledge and skills, and a resilient sense of con-
fidence to control one’s actions (Bagozzi 1992). Thus, indi-
viduals select the means to reach their goals, for instance, 
by automatically actuating a stored script or by generating 
novel means. Other self-regulatory operations include judg-
ing one’s degree of self-efficacy with which relevant actions 
can be executed, convincing oneself that one is capable of 
reaching a selected goal (Bandura 1991). The motivation-
ally triggered transformation of cognitions might constitute 
another mechanism of self-regulation, which stimulates the 
individual to approach goal-relevant targets. Motivated cog-
nition might be especially effective at the forethought phase 
of self-regulation, to motivate the individual to approach 
goal-relevant targets. As part of motivated cognition, as dis-
cussed above, people tend to view motivationally relevant 
stimuli as physically closer.
However, perception of proximity is one option to fos-
ter adaptive responding, but not the only one. We argue 
that concreteness of mental representation (i.e., low-level 
construal) more broadly allows for preparation of adaptive 
responding and thereby point out another operation of suc-
cessful self-regulation. Any event, object, and person can be 
represented at different levels of construal (Burgoon et al. 
2013; Medin and Smith 1984; Rosch 1975, 1978; Semin and 
Fiedler 1988, 1991; Shapira et al. 2012; Trope and Liberman 
2003, 2010; Vallacher and Wegner 1987, 1989). High-level 
construals include fewer details and less contextual informa-
tion than low-level construals. More specifically, high-level 
construals are abstract mental representations that extract the 
essential, core aspects of an object, person, or event. Mov-
ing from a concrete representation to a more abstract rep-
resentation involves retaining central features and omitting 
features that may vary without significantly changing the 
meaning of the represented information. Low-level, concrete 
construals, in contrast, consist of rich and specific details. 
Such construals emphasize subordinate (vs. superordinate) 
features of an object, person, or event, focusing on local (vs. 
global) perceptual elements, and processing information in 
a detailed-oriented (vs. holistic) manner (e.g., Shapira et al. 
2012; Trope and Liberman 2010).
When preparing for an action, low-level construals may 
be more functional than high-level construals. For instance, 
cybernetic theories of action control argue that actions are 
translated into sub-goals when the time of implementation 
approaches (Carver and Scheier 1981; Vallacher and Wegner 
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1987). When actions come close in time and space, their rep-
resentation increasingly includes specific means or even spe-
cific movements that are executed during the action. In other 
words, as actions are approached, they are construed on a 
more concrete level. This is the case because concrete, low-
level construal promotes adaptive responding. For instance, 
it has been demonstrated that a concrete, specific construal 
of goals (e.g., “try to reach 74 correct responses on this task 
within the next 20 min”) are more motivating and lead to 
better performance than more abstract, vague construal of 
goals (e.g., “try your best on this task”) (Latham and Locke 
1991; Locke et al. 1989; Locke and Latham 1990; for meta-
analyses, see; Mento et al. 1987; Tubbs 1986). Likewise, a 
concrete construal of actions (in form of implementation 
intentions, i.e. “If I encounter Situation X, then I’ll perform 
Behavior Y!”) triggers automatic action initiation (e.g., 
Gollwitzer 1993, 1999); and individuals are more ready to 
imitate behavior thoroughly when construing a model con-
cretely (vs. abstractly; Hansen et al. 2016). Finally, research 
on self-control has shown that individuals pursue short-term 
goals that map on their current, situated motivation (e.g., 
experiencing the yummy taste of a donut in one’s mouth) 
more than distant long-term goals (e.g., following a diet) 
when thinking concretely than when thinking abstractly 
(Fujita et al. 2006). Together, these lines of research sug-
gest that a concrete construal is more situationally bounded 
and enables adaptive responding to urgent motivations in 
the here-and-now.
Conversely, concreteness of a goal can increase one’s 
motivation (Kivetz et al. 2006). For example, people are 
more motivated to help a concrete identifiable person than 
a more abstract group of people (Kogut and Ritov 2005). 
Given the close relation between concreteness and motiva-
tion, it seems to be adaptive to construe actions more con-
cretely when they are about to be executed.
Identifying a novel path by which concreteness and moti-
vation might be linked, we propose that not only are concrete 
stimuli more motivating, but people might actively construe 
any stimulus (i.e., any object or person) on a more concrete 
level when that stimulus is appropriate to fulfill one’s goals 
and thus is motivationally relevant. On the one hand, this 
should be the case because goal-relevant stimuli are men-
tally closer than stimuli that are relevant to an alternative 
motivational state. For instance, a cold drink is relevant to a 
person when s/he feels warm, whereas a warm drink is rele-
vant to the person when s/he is in an alternative, hypothetical 
motivational state (feeling cold). Since objects relevant to an 
actual state are psychologically closer than objects related to 
a hypothetical state, the former objects should be construed 
more concretely than the latter, according to construal level 
theory (Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010). Therefore a cold 
drink should be construed more concretely than a warm 
drink when one is feeling warm. On the other hand, adaptive 
responding to a motivationally relevant object may generally 
be easier when the object is already construed on a low level. 
This is the case because stimuli that are construed on a low 
level are represented in more detail and comprise more con-
textual information, which facilitates adaptive responding.
The present research
We argue that—much as motivated distance perception may 
assist in prompting adaptive action (Cole et al. 2014)—
motivated level of construal may be a previously unknown 
mechanism to serve the same function. The present research 
tested the idea that motivational states affect the level of 
construal of stimuli that are relevant to the person in that 
state. In three experiments, we used temperature (warmth 
versus cold) to manipulate motivational states, by manipu-
lating actual room temperature or by using mental simula-
tions of warmth versus cold. We tested the hypothesis that 
warmth causes participants to construe stimuli that could 
potentially help to reduce the warmth more concretely than 
stimuli that could not. In contrast, cold would cause par-
ticipants to construe stimuli that could help to reduce the 
cold more concretely than stimuli that could not. To meas-
ure level of construal, we used breadth of categorization 
of motivationally relevant (vs. irrelevant) objects (Exp. 1), 
level of identification of motivationally relevant (vs. irrel-
evant) actions (Exp. 2), and weighting of aggregated versus 
individualized information when evaluating motivationally 
relevant (vs. irrelevant) products (Exp. 3).
In all experiments, we explain how the sample size was 
determined. All measures and manipulations are reported, 
and all exclusions are explained. For all materials and data, 
see https ://tinyu rl.com/motiv ated-const rual.
Experiment 1: Category breadth
We tested the hypothesis that experiencing warmth causes 
participants to construe objects related to cold (warmth) on 
a lower (higher) level than experiencing cold. Since previous 
research has shown that cold (versus hot) beverages are more 
desirable when experiencing warmth (versus cold; Steinmetz 
et al. 2018), we used hot versus cold beverages as stimulus 
objects. Participants were seated in either a warm or a cold 
room and asked to classify diverse hot or cold beverages 
into as many categories as they deemed appropriate. When 
objects are represented concretely, people use more and 
narrower categories (Liberman et al. 2002). Accordingly, 
we expected that participants in a cold (versus warm) room 
would use more and narrower categories of hot beverages. 
Likewise, we expected that participants in a warm (versus 
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cold) room would use more and narrower categories of cold 
beverages.
Method
Participants and design
One-hundred and forty-five students of a German university 
took part in the study. They were randomly assigned to a 
2 (Room temperature: cold, warm) × 2 (Type of beverages: 
cold, hot) between-participants design. We excluded nine 
participants because they reported that they felt disturbed 
during the experiment either because of loud noises stem-
ming from the heating/cooling system (n = 4), strong time 
pressure (n = 4), or hunger (n = 1).1 The remaining sample 
consisted of 136 participants (96 females, 40 males). Age 
ranged from 18 to 45 years (M = 24.3, SD = 4.3, Mdn = 24). 
We determined the sample size based on effects sizes found 
in related research: For instance, Balcetis and Dunning 
2010 (Exp. 1) found an effect of d = 0.43 (which translates 
to f = 0.215), Cole et al. (2014, Exp. 1) found an effect of 
d = 0.50 (which translates to f = 0.25), and Zhang and Risen 
(2014, Exp. 1) found an effect of η2 = 0.09 (which translates 
to f = 0.315). Entering the average of these three effect sizes 
(f = 0.26) and a desired power of 1—β = 0.80, an alpha level 
of α = 0.05 into the program G*Power (Faul et al. 2009) with 
specifying the numerator df = 1 and number of groups = 4 
resulted in a total sample size of 119, which means at least 
30 participants per experimental condition.
Materials and procedure
Following a procedure by IJzerman and Semin (2009; 
see also Steinmetz and Mussweiler 2011), participants 
were seated either in a cold room (approx. 17–18 °C) or a 
warm room (approx. 24–25 °C) to induce feelings of cold 
and warmth, respectively. A thermometer was placed in 
each room, outside of the visibility of the participants, to 
constantly monitor the lab temperature. New participants 
were only brought into the lab room when the appropri-
ate temperature was reached. Participants first worked on 
an unrelated filler task for about 5 min to allow the room 
temperature to unfold its impact (similar to Steinmetz and 
Mussweiler 2011). Next, participants were presented with a 
list of 30 beverages (written one below the other on the left 
side of a piece of paper). For half the participants, the list 
consisted of cold beverages (e.g., apple juice, coke, ice tea, 
wheat beer, orange juice, mineral water); for the other half 
of participants, the list consisted of hot beverages (e.g., hot 
milk with honey, cappuccino, herbal tea, hot lemon juice, 
black coffee). Participants were asked to place the items that 
belonged together into groups by copying them on the right 
side of the list and circling the group. They were instructed 
to classify every item into non-overlapping groups. Such 
a categorization task has been used previously to measure 
abstraction (e.g., Isen and Daubman 1984; Lee and Ariely 
2006; Liberman et al. 2002). Additionally, we asked par-
ticipants whether they had comments on the study in a free 
response format. As mentioned above, nine participants were 
excluded from the analyses because they reported at this 
point that they had felt disturbed during the study.
Results and discussion
The number of categories was analyzed with a 2 (Room 
temperature) by 2 (Type of beverages) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), with both factors between-participants. Cold 
beverages were classified into more categories (M = 6.74, 
SD = 2.44) than hot beverages (M = 4.33, SD = 1.96), 
F(1,132) = 56.50, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.30, 90% CI [0.195; 
0.393]. This main effect was qualified by a significant inter-
action between room temperature and type of beverages, 
F(1,132) = 4.91, p = .028, ηp2 = 0.04, 90% CI [0.002; 0.101]. 
As hypothesized and as can be seen in Fig. 1, room tempera-
ture had an effect on category breadth of cold beverages. 
Participants in the warm room classified the cold beverages 
into more (and smaller) categories (M = 7.31, SD = 2.60) 
than participants in the cold room (M = 6.15, SD = 2.16), 
F(1,132) = 6.78, p = .010, ηp2 = 0.05, 90% CI [0.006; 0.120], 
for the contrast, indicating that cold beverages were con-
strued on a more concrete, low level when sitting a warm 
Fig. 1  Mean number of categories for beverages as a function of 
room temperature and type of beverages (± 1 SE)
1 The predicted interaction effect was no longer statistically signifi-
cant when including these participants in the analysis, F(1, 141) = 
2.35, p = .128, ηp2 = .02.
Motivation and Emotion 
1 3
(vs. cold) room. However, in contrast to our hypothesis, 
room temperature did not affect category breadth of the hot 
beverages (Mwarm room = 4.21, SD = 0.98; Mcold room = 4.45, 
SD = 1.15), F(1,132) = 0.30, p = .586, ηp2 = 0.002, 90% CI 
[0.000; 0.034]. The main effect of room temperature was 
not significant, F(1,132) = 2.07, p = .153, ηp2 = 0.02, 90% CI 
[0.000; 0.066].
The findings of Experiment 1 provide first support for the 
hypothesis that motivation affects level of construal. Partici-
pants in a warm room construed stimuli that could help to 
reduce the warmth (i.e., cold beverages) on a more concrete 
level than participants in a cold room. However, so far the 
support for our hypothesis is only tentative at most: First, 
the effect disappeared when including participants who felt 
distracted during the study (see Footnote 1). Second, we 
found the effect only for cold beverages but not for warm 
beverages. The latter finding is probably due to an a priori 
smaller variety of hot beverages on the list since the list 
consisted mainly of different teas, hot milk drinks, and types 
of coffee drinks. The list of cold beverages was much more 
heterogeneous, in contrast, as reflected in larger standard 
deviations and participants’ classification into more catego-
ries overall. Additionally, if the ambient outside temperature 
was generally colder than the temperature in the lab, the 
decrease in temperature for the cold condition might not 
have been as salient as the increase in room temperature in 
the warm condition, resulting in a stronger effect in partici-
pants brought into a warm room. Given the problems with 
the present study and the materials, we used different meas-
ures for level of construal in Experiments 2 and 3.
Experiment 2: Action identification
In Experiment 2, we used a different temperature manipu-
lation to avoid the noise disturbance problems caused by 
the heating and cooling system in Experiment 1. More spe-
cifically, temperature was primed with short movies, which 
showed either a desert or a winter-scenery. Participants were 
asked to imagine themselves in the situation as best as they 
could. Such a procedure has been shown to activate the con-
cepts of warmth and cold, respectively, and to shift people’s 
behavior and preferences accordingly (Halali et al. 2017; 
Steinmetz and Posten 2017). More specifically, simulating 
being in a warm versus cold environment makes people 
actually experience physical warmth and cold, respectively 
similarly to actual experiences, which is why people’s pref-
erences and behavior are affected by the simulations (Stein-
metz et al. 2018). Subsequently, participants were presented 
with a list of actions that were related to cold, to warmth, or 
that were motivationally neutral. Following the format of the 
behavioral identification form (BIF, Vallacher and Wegner 
1989) that measures the abstractness level on which actions 
are identified, we presented participants with two alterna-
tive descriptions of the actions (one more concrete and one 
more abstract) and asked participants to choose which of 
the two best represented the given action. We proposed that 
the level of action identification of participants primed with 
the desert movie would be higher (i.e., more abstract) for 
the warm than for the cold items whereas the level of action 
identification of participants primed with the winter movie 
would be higher (i.e., more abstract) for the cold than for 
the warm items.
Method
Participants and design
One-hundred students of a German university (75 females, 
21 males, 4 unreported) took part in a study that ostensi-
bly dealt with evaluation of videos. Age ranged from 18 to 
60 years (M = 23.4, SD = 6.9, Mdn = 21). Participants were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (Movie: desert, winter-scenery) × 3 
(Type of actions: cold, hot, neutral) split-plot design with the 
first factor varied between participants and the second factor 
varied within participants. As in Experiment 1, we deter-
mined the required sample size based the average effect size 
found in the related literature (Balcetis and Dunning 2010; 
Cole et al. 2014; Zhang and Risen 2014). Entering the effect 
of f = 0.26 and a desired power of 1—β = 0.80, an alpha level 
of α = 0.05 into the program G*Power (Faul et al. 2009) with 
specifying the number of groups with 2 and the number of 
measurements with 3, with an assumed correlation between 
the repeated measures of r = 0, resulted in a total sample size 
of 50, which means at least 25 participants per experimen-
tal condition. However, by mere luck, data collection went 
faster than expected and we were able to double the number 
of participants (i.e., 50/cell) and thus to increase power. No 
data were excluded from analyses.
Materials and procedure
Participants were informed that they would watch a short 
movie clip and were instructed to imagine themselves in 
the depicted situation as best as possible. Specifically, they 
were asked to imagine being a person in the scene and to 
visualize the scene with all feelings and needs that may be 
experienced in the situation depicted in the movie. Partici-
pants watched a movie clip that lasted approximately 90 s. 
For half of the participants, the movie clip depicted a winter 
landscape with a lot of snow, accompanied by sounds of cold 
winds. For the other half of participants, the clip depicted a 
desert landscape with a lot of hot sand, accompanied by chirr 
sounds. After watching the clip, participants rated how good 
(1 = very bad, 7 = very good) and how pleasant (1 = very 
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unpleasant, 7 = very pleasant) they found the movie clip to 
be. Additionally, they indicated how well they were able to 
imagine themselves in the scenery (1 = very poorly, 7 = very 
well).
After the temperature priming task, participants worked 
on an adapted version of the BIF (Vallacher and Wegner 
1989). Participants were provided with 24 actions (e.g., recy-
cling) and two alternative descriptions of each action. One 
of the alternatives always offered a description that empha-
sized the concrete means by which the action is performed 
(e.g., bagging paper, glass, and cans). The other alterna-
tive was always more abstract and emphasized the end for 
which the action is performed (e.g., caring for the environ-
ment). For each action, participants were asked to choose the 
description that expressed the action better than the other. 
Importantly, 8 actions were related to warmth (e.g., sitting 
at the fire, having a sauna, using a hot-water bottle, running 
through hot sand), 8 were related to cold (e.g., drinking cold 
water, walking through cold rain, hiking in the snow, making 
ice cubes), and 8 items were neutral (e.g., skydiving, making 
an expensive purchase, recycling, teaching; see Fujita et al. 
2006, Exp. 3a). By including the neutral items, we can test 
whether our effects are specific to motivationally relevant 
items. The order of the 24 items and the order of the two 
response options were completely randomized. The number 
of abstract choices of the warmth items, the cold items, and 
the neutral items served as the measures of abstract construal 
of actions related to warmth, actions related to cold, and 
actions unrelated to temperature, respectively.
Results and discussion
The number of abstract choices were analyzed with a 2 
(Movie) by 3 (Type of actions) ANOVA with the second 
factor being within-participants. This analysis revealed a 
main effect of type of actions, F(2,196) = 33.08, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.25, 90% CI [0.165; 0.328]. Participants chose 
fewer abstract descriptions for the neutral items (M = 4.25, 
SD = 1.34) than for the heat items (M = 5.56, SD = 1.70), 
F(1,98) = 39.23, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.29, 90% CI [0.165; 0.393], 
and the cold items (M = 5.84, SD = 1.61), F(1,98) = 59.78, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.38, 90% CI [0.254; 0.480]. Heat and cold 
items did not differ, F(1,98) = 1.64, p = .203, ηp2 = 0.02, 90% 
CI [0.000; 0.079]. We refrain from interpreting the main 
effect between the temperature items and the neutral items 
since the items differed strongly in content, additionally to 
the temperature connotation. The main effect of the movie 
was not significant, F(1,98) = 0.07, p = .792, ηp2 = 0.001, 
90% CI [0.000; 0.028].
Importantly, as hypothesized and can be seen in 
Fig.  2, the movie interacted with the type of actions, 
F(2,196) = 3.14, p = .045, ηp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.000; 
0.075]. Depending on the temperature content of the 
movie, participants chose different numbers of high-level 
action descriptions of the heat and cold items: Participants 
who watched the cold movie chose more abstract descrip-
tions for the cold items (M = 6.06, SD = 1.36) than partici-
pants who watched the warm movie (M = 5.61, SD = 1.82), 
whereas participants who watched the warm movie chose 
more abstract descriptions for the heat items (M = 5.84, 
SD = 1.60) than participants who watched the cold movie 
(M = 5.29, SD = 1.76), F(1,98) = 5.50, p = .021, ηp2 = 0.05, 
90% CI [0.004; 0.138] for the interaction contrast.
The findings of Experiment 2 provide further support 
for the hypothesis that motivation affects level of con-
strual. Participants who envisioned themselves in a desert 
construed actions that could help to reduce the (presum-
ably) experienced warmth on a more concrete level than 
participants who envisioned themselves in a winter-scen-
ery. In contrast, participants who envisioned themselves 
in a winter-scenery construed actions that could help to 
reduce the (presumably) experienced cold on a more con-
crete level than participants who envisioned themselves 
in a desert. In contrast, the temperature manipulation did 
not affect the construal of the neutral items. Thereby, the 
hypothesis that temperature influences people’s construal 
of motivationally relevant items, but not of irrelevant 
items, is supported.
However, the findings show that motivation affected con-
strual level more in the cold movie condition than in the 
warmth movie condition. This difference could be explained 
by the fact that the cold movie was filmed from a first-person 
perspective, whereas the warmth movie was filmed from a 
third-person perspective. Accordingly, it was possibly easier to 
follow the instructions to imagine oneself in the environment 
for the cold movie condition than for the warmth movie condi-
tion, which may have resulted in the stronger effect in the cold 
Fig. 2  Mean number of abstract choices as a function of type of 
movie and type of actions (± 1 SE)
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movie condition. In Experiment 3, we used a different method 
to manipulate cold versus warmth to avoid possible confounds.
Additionally, there was some conceptual similarity between 
the content of the temperature primes (e.g., the depiction of 
snow), and some of the temperature-related items (e.g., hik-
ing in the snow). Such similarity could potentially introduce 
a confound by activating the concept of snow and thereby 
increasing participants’ likelihood to choose the snow-related 
action (regardless of whether snow was part of the concrete 
or abstract representation). To address this confound, we took 
great care to use a variety of temperature-related items (e.g., 
ice cubes, etc.) to minimize the conceptual overlap between the 
primes and the items. Nevertheless, if this confound affected 
participants’ judgments, the expected pattern of results would 
be different from what we found. Specifically, participants who 
watched the snow video would be more likely to select all 
snow-related options, regardless of their level of abstraction. 
However, we found that participants who watched the snow 
video chose more abstract representations of cold-related items 
across the specific content of these items.
Experiment 3: Weighting of individualized 
versus aggregated information
Research has shown that level of construal influences the type 
of information on which participants base their judgments and 
decisions. That is, when construing an object on a low level, 
people shift their attention from aggregated to individualized 
information about the object (Bruchmann and Evans 2013; 
Ledgerwood et al. 2010). For instance, low-level, concrete rep-
resentations enhance the relative influence of product informa-
tion that is closely tied to a single experience within a specific 
context compared to broad, decontextualized information 
which is averaged across multiple individuals and instances 
(Ledgerwood et al. 2010). In Experiment 3, we investigated 
whether such a downstream consequence of level of construal 
is affected by motivational states. Specifically, we tested the 
hypothesis that warmth would cause participants to put more 
weight on individualized information than on averaged infor-
mation when the evaluated object could help to reduce the 
warmth, that is, when participants evaluate ventilators. Cold, 
in contrast, should cause participants to put more weight on 
individualized information than on averaged information when 
the evaluated object could help reducing the cold, that is, when 
participants evaluate heaters.
Method
Participants and design
Sixty students of an Austrian university (41 females, 
19 males) took part in a study that ostensibly dealt with 
perspective-taking skills. Age ranged from 16 to 62 years 
(M = 23.4, SD = 7.7, Mdn = 21). Participants were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (Prime: warm, cold) × 2 (Product: ventilators, 
heaters) × 2 (Information Type: product favored by average 
information, product favored by individualized informa-
tion) mixed design with the second and third factors varied 
within participants. As in Experiment 1, we determined the 
required sample size based the average effect size found 
in the related literature (Balcetis and Dunning 2010; Cole 
et al. 2014; Zhang and Risen 2014). Entering the effect of 
f = 0.26 and a desired power of 1—β = 0.80, an alpha level 
of α = 0.05 into the program G*Power (Faul et al. 2009) with 
specifying the number of groups with 2 and the number of 
measurements with 4 (since participants rated heaters and 
ventilators favored by individualized information and heat-
ers and ventilators favored averaged information), with an 
assumed correlation between the ratings of r = 0, resulted 
in a total sample size of 42, which means at least 21 par-
ticipants per experimental condition. Again, we were lucky 
to be able to run more participants (i.e., 30 per cell) and to 
thus increase power. No data were excluded from analyses.
Materials and procedure
Participants were instructed to read a short story and to try 
to take the perspective of the protagonist and relive his/her 
feelings and thoughts as best as they could. Participants 
read a story about a person who was waiting for the bus 
either on a very hot summer day or on a very cold winter 
day (between participants). Both stories were written from 
a first-person perspective. As in Experiment 2, we expected 
that the simulation of the stories would lead people to actu-
ally feel warmer versus colder (building on Steinmetz et al. 
2018), which would subsequently affect their judgments. 
Specifically, the stories read:
It is hot [cold]. In the morning, the thermometer has 
already shown 31 °C [− 13 °C], and also during the 
previous days, the temperature was well above 30° 
[below 0°]. I’m standing at the bus stop in the hope 
of catching the last bus. My sweat flows [I get goose 
bumps] when I think about walking by foot for 1 h in 
the boiling heat [in the bone-chilling cold] under the 
blazing sun [through snowfall and without gloves]. But 
thank god the bus is turning around the corner, and 
I’m looking forward to entering the air-conditioned 
[heated] bus and to escaping the torrid heat [the biting 
cold]. But when the doors open, hot [cold] air streams 
against me. Unfortunately, I had to find out that the air-
conditioning [the heating unit] of the bus is not work-
ing. I have the feeling that it is even hotter [colder] 
inside the bus than outside. I start to sweat [to jitter] 
even more, so much that the sweat is flowing from my 
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forehead like water [that my teeth clatter repeatedly 
and uncontrollably]. After I get off the bus, someone 
approaches me and asks me to fill in a short question-
naire.2
Next, participants were instructed to evaluate the fol-
lowing products as if they were the protagonist. They were 
asked to imagine purchasing the products via Amazon.com 
(see Hansen and Melzner 2014; Ledgerwood et al. 2010, 
for a similar measurement of construal level). They were 
presented with the pictures of two ventilators on one page 
and with the pictures of two heaters on another page. The 
order of the two pages was counter-balanced. Beneath each 
product, participants found an aggregated evaluation and a 
single review. One of the ventilators and one of the heaters 
was favored by the aggregated (abstract) information: They 
had an average rating of 4.5 out of 5 stars, although the sin-
gle (concrete) review stated the opposite, namely that “the 
ventilator has no cooling effect and the money should better 
be invested in a better product” and “the heater is cheap crap 
and one should better look for an alternative,” respectively. 
The other ventilator and heater were favored by individual-
ized (concrete) information: It had an average (abstract) rat-
ing of only 2.5 of 5 stars, but the single review said that “the 
ventilator is small, very quiet, light, and odorless with a very 
good cooling effect” and that “the heater has a very good 
value for money and holds what it promises”, respectively. 
The order of the pictures and the assignment of the informa-
tion to the pictures were counterbalanced across conditions.
Finally, participants rated how interested, likely, con-
fident, and happy they would be about buying each prod-
uct and how they generally felt about each product from 1 
(not at all/very unlikely/very negative) to 7 (extremely/very 
likely/very positive). Responses to these five items were 
averaged for each product to form evaluation scores for the 
ventilator favored by the aggregated information (α = 0.94), 
the ventilator favored by the individualized information 
(α = 0.94), the heater favored by the aggregated informa-
tion (α = 0.94), and the heater favored by the individualized 
information (α = 0.95).
Results and discussion
A 2 (Prime) by 2 (Product) by 2 (Information Type) mixed-
design ANOVA on the evaluation revealed a main effect 
of the product, F(1,56) = 9.41, p = .003, ηp2 = 0.14, 90% 
CI [0.030; 0.282], indicating that participants preferred 
ventilators (M = 4.02, SD = 0.83) over heaters (M = 3.59, 
SD = 1.07). Across products, participants preferred prod-
ucts with the positive individualized information (M = 4.61, 
SD = 1.13) over products with the positive aggregated infor-
mation (M = 3.01, SD = 1.21), F(1,56) = 38.89, p < .001, 
ηp2 = 0.41, 90% CI [0.242; 0.532]. Additionally, as could 
be expected when temperature causes an approach motiva-
tion towards objects which could help to fulfill one’s needs, 
the prime interacted with the product, F(1,56) = 25.53, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.31, 90% CI [0.151; 0.448]. Participants 
who were primed with warmth evaluated the ventilators 
(M = 4.49, SD = 0.64) more positively than the heaters 
(M = 3.23, SD = 1.18), F(1,56) = 31.87, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.36, 
90% CI [0.196; 0.492]. In contrast, participants who were 
primed with cold evaluated the heaters (M = 3.93, SD = 0.83) 
more positively than the ventilators (M = 3.62, SD = 0.77), 
although the latter difference did not reach significance, 
F(1,56) = 2.04, p = .159, ηp2 = 0.04, 90% CI [0.000; 0.141].
Importantly, as hypothesized, the effect of prime on 
evaluations was qualified by the type of information, indi-
cating that participants focused more on the low-level, 
concrete information when evaluating products that could 
help reducing the uncomfortable state than when evaluating 
products that could not, F(1,56) = 10.34, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.16, 
90% CI [0.037; 0.295] for the three-way interaction. As 
can be seen in Fig. 3, when participants were primed with 
warmth, they evaluated the concrete version of the venti-
lator (i.e., favored by individualized information) more 
positively (M = 5.44, SD = 1.35) than the abstract version 
of the ventilator (i.e., favored by aggregated information) 
(M = 3.55, SD = 1.50), F(1,56) = 14.17, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20, 
90% CI [0.065; 0.342] for the contrast. This effect was 
much smaller for the evaluation of the heaters (Mindividualized 
= 3.73, SD = 1.50 versus Maggregated = 2.72, SD = 1.47), 
F(1,56) = 5.54, p = .022, ηp2 = 0.09, 90% CI [0.007; 0.219] 
for the contrast; F(1,27) = 4.84, p = .037, ηp2 = 0.15, 90% CI 
[0.005; 0.344] for the interaction within the warmth-primed 
group (Fig. 3, Panel A). In contrast, when participants were 
primed with cold, they evaluated the concrete version of 
the heater (i.e., favored by individualized information) 
more positively (M = 5.23, SD = 1.51) than the abstract ver-
sion of the heater (i.e., favored by aggregate information) 
(M = 2.63, SD = 1.61), F(1,56) = 39.35, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.41, 
90% CI [0.245; 0.535] for the contrast. This effect was only 
marginally significant for the evaluation of the ventilators, 
(Mindividualized = 4.10, SD = 1.55 versus Maggregated = 3.14, 
2 A pretest indicated that these stories effectively influence subjective 
states. Eighty-five students (59 females, 25 males, 1 unreported) who 
attended a lecture read the stories and estimated the room temperature 
of the lecture hall and indicated how strongly they were sweating and 
how thirsty they were on 7-point scales (among other filler items). 
Participants who read the warmth story estimated the room tempera-
ture to be higher (M = 20.6 ˚C, SD = 3.3) than participants who read 
the cold story (M = 17.4 ˚C, SD = 7.4), t(83) = 2.585, p = .011, η2 = 
.07. Participants who read the warmth story also indicated that they 
were sweating more (M = 4.07, SD = 1.16) and were thirstier (M = 
4.65, SD = 1.69) than participants who read the cold story (Msweating 
= 3.48, SD = 1.35; Mthirst = 3.95, SD = 1.61), t(83) = 2.176, p = 
.032, η2 = .05 and t(83) = 1.953, p = .054, η2 = .04, respectively.
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SD = 1.59), F(1,56) = 3.94, p = .052, ηp2 = 0.07, 90% CI 
[0.000; 0.187] for the contrast; F(1,29) = 6.20, p = .019, 
ηp2 = 0.18, 90% CI [0.017; 0.363] for the interaction within 
the cold-primed group (Fig.  3, Panel B). The interac-
tion between prime and information type, F(1,56) = 0.41, 
p = .525, ηp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.000; 0.081], and the interac-
tion between product and information type, F(1,56) = 0.93, 
p = .338, ηp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.000; 0.105], were not 
significant.
Taken together, the warmth (vs. cold) prime lead par-
ticipants to evaluate the coolers (vs. heaters) more posi-
tively, consistent with previous research on goal activation 
(Zhang and Risen 2014). Our results additionally show that 
this effect is moderated by the information on which par-
ticipants focus. Whereas more concrete information in our 
experiment generally has a larger influence on evaluations, 
this effect is even more pronounced for those products that 
are goal-relevant (i.e., coolers in the warm condition and 
heaters in the cold condition), because participants focus 
on concrete information especially when that information 
is goal-relevant. As an alternative explanation, one might 
argue that the findings of Experiment 3 are not mainly driven 
by the fact that the information is provided in abstract or 
concrete terms per se, but by the fact that the individualized 
information already evokes goal attainment. In other words, 
when a goal is activated, people might rely more on informa-
tion that promises goal attainment than information that does 
not, without necessarily considering the construal level on 
which the information is conveyed. However, in our view, 
the averaged information in form of many versus few stars is 
just as useful for goal attainment (i.e., receiving information 
of the product) as the individual information, which renders 
this alternative explanation rather unlikely.
General discussion
The findings of the present research generally support the 
idea that motivational states can affect level of construal. 
Experiment 1 provided evidence for the hypothesis that 
participants who experienced warmth were construing cool 
beverages more concretely than participants who experi-
enced cold. Experiment 2 extended these findings by demon-
strating that participants who imagined themselves in a hot 
environment were construing actions related to cold more 
concretely than actions related to heat, whereas the reverse 
was found for participants who imagined themselves in a 
cold environment. Finally, Experiment 3 showed a down-
stream consequence of the motivated-construal effect: Moti-
vation affected the type of information on which participants 
based the evaluation of products. When evaluating prod-
ucts that potentially match one’s current motivation (e.g., 
reducing experienced warmth or cold), participants placed 
more weight on concrete, individualized product features 
than on abstract, averaged product features—more so than 
when evaluating products that did not match their current 
motivational state.
We suggest that a concrete construal of actions and 
objects that may help to reach one’s goals or to fulfill one’s 
needs is psychologically adaptive because concrete construal 
may better enable mental simulation of adaptive respond-
ing to the stimulus. Such a functional view of motivated 
construal fits previous research that shows that concretely 
construed events seem more likely to happen (Wakslak and 
Trope 2009) and that a concrete construal supports a focus 
on the effects of actions instead of the causes (Hansen et al. 
2013; Rim et al. 2013). Both consequences of concrete 
construal—increased likelihood perceptions and a focus on 
effects of actions—may guide motivation and provide a cog-
nitive mechanism that supports motivated action.
We argue that experiencing a visceral state, such as cold 
or warmth, can motivate participants to reduce that state 
(see also Zhang and Risen 2014), and thus causes concrete 
Fig. 3  Mean evaluations of heaters and ventilators as a function of 
type of information which favored the product (aggregated or indi-
vidualized) and prime (warmth versus cold) (± 1 SE)
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construal of actions and objects that help to reduce the 
state. Yet, one may wonder whether the temperature primes 
actually led participants to feel warmer versus colder, and 
whether this visceral state prompted the motivation to seek 
goal-relevant objects or activities. We believe so, as previous 
literature (e.g., Steinmetz et al. 2018) has demonstrated that 
even looking at pictures of warm or cold environments can 
increase feelings of warmth or cold, respectively. Addition-
ally, the findings of the pretest in Experiment 3 (see Footnote 
2) suggest that the primes effectively altered the states of the 
participants. Following from this notion, we would expect 
that satisfying the motivational state would also eliminate 
the effects of the primes on level of construal. For instance, 
offering a cold drink to participants who were primed with 
warmth would cause participants to not any longer represent 
further cold drinks on a more concrete level. Future research 
is needed to test this hypothesis.
As an alternative, non-motivational account of the present 
findings, one could argue that any visceral state per se, such 
as warmth, would foster an abstract construal of actions and 
objects which are related to that state (e.g., warm bever-
ages), instead of increasing concrete construal of actions 
and objects related to the opposite, pursued state (e.g., cold 
drinks). Previous research on construal level theory (Trope 
and Liberman 2003, 2010), however, speaks against such an 
interpretation of our data, as it convincingly demonstrated 
that the present is construed more concretely than the future. 
Accordingly, a present visceral state (and its related con-
cepts) should be construed more concretely than its solu-
tion (which lies in the future). Thus, according to construal 
level theory, when experiencing warmth, participants should 
represent actions and objects related to this present state as 
more concrete (and not as more abstract). Nevertheless, even 
if it was the case that actions and objects that are related to 
the current state are construed on an abstract, generalized 
level, it may still be possible that such a generalized view of 
the current motivational state helps to build up motivation: 
An abstract construal of the current state may show that it is 
of primary concern and may urge the individual towards its 
solution. Such a process does not prohibit a concrete repre-
sentation of then approached stimuli. Both processes may 
be two sides of the same coin and act in tandem to foster 
adaptive responding.
Relatedly, it may be that participants felt an avoidance 
motivation toward the objects that would exacerbate their 
current aversive state. For example, if one is warm, a warm 
beverage may elicit an avoidance motivation. One could 
argue that this motivation, in turn, may lead to a more con-
crete construal of the warm beverage. Apart from the fact 
that a warm feeling may just as well lead to an approach 
motivation (towards cold drinks), such an effect would 
not be in line with the present findings and, at best, may 
be an opposing force that works against the found effect, 
which may explain the fact that some of the present find-
ings are mixed (see e.g., Footnote 1). Additionally, while 
it has indeed been demonstrated that an avoidance moti-
vation causes more concrete thinking it general (Friedman 
and Förster 2001; Lee et al. 2010), it has not been shown 
that specific objects are construed more concretely. In this 
respect, the present findings suggest that motivational rel-
evance is a moderator of the general finding that avoidance 
motivation causes concrete construal.
While the discussion in the previous paragraph focuses 
on “content-free” construal processes (i.e., both warmth and 
cold may lead to concrete versus abstract construal), it is also 
possible that one specific state (e.g., warmth) directionally 
triggers a specific construal level (e.g., concrete construal). 
Indeed, it has been argued that warmth fosters concrete 
construal per se (IJzerman et al. 2014; IJzerman and Semin 
2009). That account would suggest a main effect: Warmth 
should generally lead to more concrete construal of all stim-
uli. Although such a main effect was not visible in our data, 
it may explain part of the present data: For instance, it would 
explain why we did not find a full cross-over interaction in 
Experiment 1 (i.e., why participants in a warm room repre-
sented hot beverages as concrete as cold beverages). How-
ever, a potentially confounding main effect of temperature 
cannot explain the interaction effects found in the present 
research, by which warmth affects only goal-relevant stimuli 
but not all stimuli.
One limitation of the present findings is that, in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, the effect of interest was present either only 
for warmth (Exp. 1) or only for cold (Exp. 2), respectively. 
Merely in Experiment 3, the warm and the cold motivational 
states both shifted level of construal. This disparity may be 
due to the differences in the novel experimental paradigms 
that were used. Thus, each experiment might have its unique 
weaknesses, as discussed in the Discussion sections of the 
single experiments. Importantly, however, the interaction 
effect emerged in all experiments, which corroborates our 
main hypothesis across experiments. Even if the evidence 
of a single experiment was not as reliable as one would have 
wished, the overall pattern of findings strongly supports the 
idea that individuals construe goal-relevant stimuli more 
concretely than goal-irrelevant stimuli.
Additionally, the critical reader might be concerned that 
our results stem from compliance with perceived experimen-
tal demand. However, the nature of our dependent variables 
renders such an explanation unlikely. Especially in Experi-
ment 3, although the effect of temperature on the evaluation 
of the two product types (i.e., warmth causes a preference 
for ventilators; cold causes a preference for heaters) may be 
explained by demand characteristics, the effect of interest 
cannot. To be able to give presumably desirable answers, 
participants would have to intuit that we expect temperature 
to affect motivation and thereby construal and that we expect 
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these construal differences to result in differences in atten-
tion to the more global versus more individual evaluations of 
different products of the same category—a reasoning that is 
likely beyond the scope of psychological sophistication that 
most participants have. Thus, we expect that experimental 
demand cannot explain our results as a whole.
Our findings demonstrate that actions and objects that are 
goal-relevant are construed more concretely than actions and 
objects that are not. Importantly, however, we did not find 
that the construal of goal-irrelevant stimuli is also affected 
(Experiment 2). Thus, our effects cannot be due to a general 
shift an abstraction based on temperature (as suggested by 
IJzerman et al. 2014; IJzerman and Semin 2009). We also 
did not expect a temperature effect on the the general style 
of thinking, because approach motivation causes a more 
global processing style whereas avoidance motivation causes 
a more local processing style (Derryberry and Tucker 1994; 
Easterbrock 1959; Friedman and Förster 2001; Tyler and 
Tucker 1982). It is psychologically extremely adaptive to 
think globally when trying to reach a goal, as global atten-
tion helps to not to miss relevant information that may help 
to reach one’s goal. However, we argue that, as soon as goal-
relevant stimuli (actions, people, or objects) are available, 
people switch to a concrete construal of these stimuli. A 
general global, abstract style of thinking may help to identify 
goal-relevant stimuli, but a concrete, local representation 
helps to act towards the stimuli. Such dynamics of motivated 
construal and its shift have not been investigated so far and 
may constitute a fruitful direction for follow-up research.
The present research used temperature as a factor to 
manipulate motivational states. It is an open question, 
though, whether other motivations besides reducing warmth 
or cold also affect level of construal. For instance, does 
hunger trigger a concrete construal of food? And can more 
abstract motivations, such as achievement motivation or 
power motivation, also affect construal level of goal-relevant 
stimuli? We suggest that this may well be the case, although 
data on these questions are still pending.
Motivational effects on one’s level of construal have wide 
and interesting implications. For instance, motivations could 
shift product evaluations, as has been shown in Experiment 
3. Additionally, construal level can affect visual versus ver-
bal modes of processing (Amit et al. 2012), similarity versus 
differences focus (Förster et al. 2008), and perceptions of 
prototypicality (Liberman et al. 2002). Motivational effects 
on construal could have further downstream consequences, 
for instance on the experiences of time (Hansen and Trope 
2013), duration prediction (Kanten 2011), politeness (Ste-
phan et al. 2010), integrative versus distributive solutions 
in negotiations (Henderson and Trope 2009), or imitation 
(Hansen et al. 2016; Wessler and Hansen 2017). Could it 
be, for instance, that the motivation to approach a person 
reduces formal politeness (as a sign of a more concrete 
construal of the interaction) towards this person? Or does 
a strong motivation to get a certain outcome in a negotia-
tion lead to a more distributive (concrete) negotiation style? 
Investigation of such construal-related downstream conse-
quences may be a promising avenue for future research.
The present findings show how motivations can affect 
judgments. Not only do motivations influence the content 
of one’s thoughts, they also change one’s level of construal. 
Motivation to approach objects and actions that help reduc-
ing a visceral state triggers a concrete construal of these 
objects and action, presumably in order to prepare an adap-
tive response.
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